To the Editor:

Professor Brittan argues persuasively that public funding of higher education is justified not for the sake of economic benefit, but for the sake of a healthy democratic society. Brittan's argument may not resonate with a public worried about its economic well-being, but it is a thoughtful justification for public funding of higher education and deserves our attention. This said, I note a couple of not-so-easy corollaries of Brittan's position. If we find either corollary distasteful, then it's back to the drawing board.

First, public universities should get out of the business of career preparation save perhaps for areas like health care and K-12 education, where all residents have an equal stake in a well-trained work force. Not all residents stand to benefit equally from well-trained marketing executives, hotel employees, etc.; some stand to benefit a great deal, but most will have to be satisfied by "the rising tide that lifts all boats." Drawing the line between those disciplines that underwrite liberal democracy and those that exist for the sake of career preparation would not be easy. But it's a task that should be undertaken if we adhere to Brittan's argument. It's also not easy to know the effects of leaving career preparation to private concerns. But it's entirely possible that such support as there is for state universities might be severely eroded in this circumstance. Ironically, for the sake of democracy it may be better to nourish the illusion that public universities deserve support for economic reasons.

The second corollary concerns the availability of publicly funded universities, and here a distinction needs to be made. Some states, like Montana and Arizona, make available substantially the same level of education to all who attend public universities. But other states, like Michigan and California, provide a two-tiered system. Only arrangements of the latter sort have been the focus of affirmative action battles, presumably because students who attend the elite universities benefit more from their education than those who attend the Cal States and the (insert your favorite compass point) Michigans. Otherwise, there's nothing to fight about. It's not easy to justify a two-tiered system on the kinds of grounds Brittan accepts for publicly funded institutions. Indeed, it seems especially undemocratic that the brightest students--who enjoy already a considerable advantage in earning potential--should, at public expense, receive the additional benefit of education at an elite institution. Regardless of culture or ethnicity, taxpayers in California and Michigan ought to complain mightily about paying taxes for a benefit denied to their own children on account of their genetic endowment. Fortunately, most states haven't a two-tiered system, and there it seems more likely that public universities can serve the interests of democracy.

But even in states without the two-tier system a conflict with democracy arises if we restrict publicly funded higher education to those who can benefit from it. Whether from lack of interest, talent, financial resources or preparation, some will be asked to pay for higher education without deriving the presumed increase in earning power. How can this policy be justified if the rationale for publicly funded higher education is a healthy democratic society? Presuming that limited admissions are based in the principle that democratic society is better off if it maximizes the number of highly educated voters, the vote of the unqualified takes on the hue of a necessary evil. Since they help to fund "our" education, we'll allow "their" vote, even if it's not as careful and thoughtful as ours. In effect, by limiting access to higher education, we wind up treating some eligible voters as means rather than as ends in themselves. So here is the second corollary: The benefits of higher education ought to be available--in a robust sense of "available"--to everyone who is eligible to vote.

David Sherry
Philosophy
Northern Arizona University