[The Montana Professor 18.1, Fall 2007 <http://mtprof.msun.edu>]

The American System of Social Security: Separating Fact from Fallacy

Max J. Skidmore
Thomas Jefferson Fellow
University of Missouri Curators' Professor of Political Science
University of Missouri-Kansas City

I

--Max Skidmore
Max Skidmore

Social Security by any measure is among the most important programs in the United States. Directly and indirectly, it affects almost every person in the country. It provides life insurance for minor dependents of workers along with disability insurance for the working population, while it greatly enhances Americans' independence by relieving most of the younger and middle-aged of having to support their elderly relatives. At the same time it gives independence and dignity to the aged themselves.

A large majority of America's retirees, some 65% or so, rely on Social Security benefits for half or more of their total income. As reported by the Social Security Administration, a sizeable minority of our aged population, some 30%, receive 90% or more of their income from Social Security. Two-thirds of these--one-fifth of all older people in the United States--have no income at all except their Social Security benefits./1/ To put this in absolute numbers, Social Security lifts nearly 13 million elderly Americans above the poverty line. Without their Social Security benefits, nearly half of all elderly Americans (46.8%) would fall into poverty; with Social Security, only 8.7% are so classified./2/ This is still too many, to be sure, but these figures nonetheless demonstrate the vast positive effect of America's social insurance system.

 

These positive effects certainly place Social Security among the most popular program in American history. Unfortunately, though, it has come to be among the most misunderstood.

For a quarter of a century or so, much of the information directed toward the public about Social Security has ranged from the misleading to the incorrect. Considering the program's importance--which includes not only enormous size, but also direct effects on people's lives--the lack of understanding is troublesome. The late Will Rogers is supposed to have remarked, "It ain't what people don't know that's so dangerous; it's what people know that just ain't so!" As this article will make clear, that comment certainly pertains to Social Security.

Much of the misunderstanding results from a deliberate campaign--now quite well documented--to undermine America's highly successful system of social insurance./3/ Funding for this effort comes from investment bankers and assorted financial interests that hope to profit from privatizing the system. Ideological enthusiasm comes from a number of organizations.

The Concord Coalition, for example, has been among the most successful. It manages to present itself as bi-partisan and "reasonable," while working diligently to foster its agenda, which is to create doubt about "entitlements." Concord reflects the attitudes of Peter Peterson, former secretary of commerce under President Nixon and an anti-Social Security zealot.

Considerable intellectual energy comes from the libertarian Cato Institute. Years ago, as Cato's "Project on Social Security Privatization" was getting underway, I debated the project's director, the able and urbane Michael Tanner. When I accused him of heading a project that had spent two million dollars in a deliberate effort to undermine confidence in Social Security, he corrected me, saying smugly--and no doubt accurately--that the amount had been three million dollars. It has been vastly more than that now, of course, and, under pressure from the Bush White House Cato has changed the name--not the aim--of its project to the more focus-group friendly "Project on Social Security Choice."

Cato and its libertarians are quasi-anarchists. Similar, or even more extreme, sentiments exist elsewhere. A few "anarcho-capitalists"--ironically, often from comfortable academic positions, and sometimes even in state colleges and universities--are devoted to minimizing government and eliminating social programs, especially Social Security. To be sure, being sheltered from the "real world" may help ideologues remain ideologues, and enable them, as the saying goes, to swallow camels while they strain at gnats. The more extreme of these extremists reflect ideas from Herbert Hoover rather than any historical evidence. They take the gnat-straining position that Social Security, health care, and similar programs constitute government threats to liberty. Swallowing the camel, many of them ignore the very real violations from such things as warrantless wiretapping, security requirements at airports that range from inconvenient to humiliating, asset forfeiture under the "drug war" and other programs, the suspension of habeas corpus (which assumes guilt and denies the arrested person even the opportunity to demonstrate proof of citizenship, let alone to present evidence of innocence), and issuance of "National Security Letters" that can lead to jail for recipients if they even reveal that they have received the letters. They also ignore genuine economic threats to liberty from unemployment, low wages, high health care costs, and the like.

Certainly, reasonable people will disagree, but consensus is possible. That is the essence of democratic politics. The more complicated an issue, the more genuine disagreement there likely will be, but thoughtful discourse and sound information can bring consensus. Social Security, of course, is a complicated subject. Developing an informed opinion requires more than becoming familiar with the positions of its opponents and its supporters. First, it is necessary to examine the nature of the program itself. Then, it is important to do something that few people have done: that is to examine critically the government's own official projections. Therein lies the path to sound information.

II

What is Social Security?

In the broadest sense, "social security" can apply to any program protecting the health or income of citizens. That use is common in countries abroad. In the United States, it can technically mean any program that originated under the Social Security Act of 1935, or any one under the Act as subsequently amended. That could include such things as unemployment insurance, the original programs of Aid to the Blind and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, or to the various incarnations of "welfare," as it has progressed from ADC (Aid to Dependent Children) to AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) to TANF (Temporary Assistance to Needy Families).

In both popular and professional usage, however, American "Social Security" generally means contributory social insurance. Although such a definition could include Medicare, which certainly is "contributory social insurance," Medicare is usually considered separately. That will be the usage in this article. "Social Security" will refer to the contributory social insurance programs of income maintenance (Old-Age, Survivors,' and Disability Insurance). It will not include Medicare unless the text so indicates.

How Does Social Security Function?

The financing for Social Security comes from the FICA tax (Federal Insurance Contributions Act) levied on workers' wages with a matching tax on employers. The tax rate is 6.2% on each, with an additional 1.45% levied on each for Medicare. The amount of wages subject to FICA taxes is capped; Medicare taxes apply to all wages with no limit.

Benefit levels are calculated on a thirty-five year period, the worker's thirty-five years of highest wages. Their levels are progressive. The average earner receives benefits equal to just over 40% of wages at retirement; the high earner receives around 27%, while the low earner receives almost 56%./4/ Note that these figures are for retirees only. They do not include additional benefits paid to dependents.

For 2007, the worker pays FICA taxes on the first $97,500 of income from covered employment, with the employer paying a matching tax. Thus, wages above that amount are free from FICA taxes. As indicated, all wages in covered employment, regardless of amount, are subject to taxation for Medicare. In declaring income for income-tax purposes, workers cannot--and despite allegations to the contrary on the Internet, have never been able to--deduct FICA taxes nor Medicare taxes.

Some economists argue that workers pay a 12.4% tax for Social Security, assuming that the employer's share is "part of the worker's wage." That is a philosophical, not a practical, position. If Social Security were eliminated, only under the most rosy scenario would employers add their match to workers' salaries. In this age of downsizing and restricting benefits, it would be foolishly unrealistic to assume that employers voluntarily would do so. Moreover, if a worker earns $50,000, she reports that $50,000 to the IRS, not $50,000 plus the employer's FICA payment on her behalf of 6.2%. Consider further that a $50,000 worker would hardly be able to make the case when applying for a loan that his salary is not really $50,000, but is actually $53,100. Lenders know better. Thus, in the real world, the worker pays 6.2% for Social Security, not the full 12.4%

What are Social Security's Benefits?

Social Security provides partial replacement for lost wages resulting from a number of factors. Retirement ("old-age") is the most common. So prominent is the retirement benefit, that many criticisms of Social Security consider it as solely a retirement system and evaluate it accordingly, thus producing evaluations that are incomplete and misleading. Social Security pays benefits to retirees, to their retirement-age spouses, and to any minor dependents. A spouse's benefit, assuming retirement at full retirement age, will be 50% of the wage earner's. If the spouse has his or her own wage record, the benefit will equal that from whichever record produces the greatest benefit; the spouse cannot draw the full benefit from both.

Wage-earner death, similarly, brings benefits to qualified survivors. Widows or widowers of retirement age receive benefits, as do the wage earner's minor dependents. Under certain conditions, there may be benefits even to dependent parents of the wage earner.

Inability to work because of physical or mental impairment is another cause of lost wages. Disability benefits go to those with serious health conditions that prevent them from holding substantial jobs.

Nearly one-third of Social Security's benefit checks go to those who are younger than retirement age. These are the disabled, and the survivors of deceased wage-earners. Social Security benefits, in fact, are responsible for raising one million American children from poverty./5/

It is apparent from all this that it is misleading to think of Social Security solely as a retirement program. It is also misleading to think of it as an investment scheme, and to attempt to evaluate its "rate of return." Moreover, in contrast to investment plans, all Social Security benefits are protected against inflation; they rise with the cost of living.

III

How Do the Trust Funds Operate?

FICA taxes go into one of two trust funds: 5.3% goes to the Old-Age and Survivors' Insurance Trust Fund; 0.9% goes to the Disability Insurance Trust Fund. Medicare operates through a separate Hospital Insurance Trust Fund. The trust funds pay current benefits and administrative expenses, and invest the surplus in special government bonds that mature regularly, paying interest back into the funds. OASDI administrative expenses are extraordinarily low, less than one cent for every dollar paid in; no private income program can come close to matching Social Security's efficiency.

There are two foremost concerns about the trust funds. One is based on the charge that the government has drained their contents to use for non-Social Security purposes. The second is that they are financed inadequately; that they some day will be depleted causing Social Security to become "bankrupt." Bankruptcy, though, is not a notion that can be applied accurately to any program of the U.S. government. At the current time, virtually every federal program is running at a deficit--the FBI, Homeland Security, the U.S. Marine Corps, the White House Office, etc.--except for Social Security, which is accumulating robust surplus funds; yet which is it that causes concern?

It is correct that government has borrowed the funds for current expenses. It is decidedly not correct, though, to charge that the funds have been misused, or that the trust funds have no assets, only "worthless IOUs," as even President Bush has said. If the President were to announce to Japanese, Korean, or Chinese governments or private investors here or abroad that the US bonds they hold were "worthless IOUs," the world financial system would be shaken. The trust funds hold US bonds with equally valid claims on the US Treasury. It is ignorant and irresponsible to claim otherwise. If it were to become necessary to tax or borrow to pay off the bonds, that would not be taxing or borrowing to pay Social Security benefits. Rather, it would be taxing or borrowing to pay for the purposes for which the money originally was spent (almost assuredly military expenditures).

The huge and increasing national debt does not result from Social Security. It results from deficit spending. Our elected officials in recent years have been determined to keep taxes at low levels regardless of the consequences. In other words, they have been unwilling to levy taxes sufficient to cover the amounts they have voted to spend. Acting to reduce taxes at the same time as undertaking vast new military expenditures is only the most flagrant example.

Critics of the trust funds actually contradict themselves in a glaring manner. If the funds are truly meaningless--if they do, indeed, contain only "worthless IOUs" and nothing of value--then it makes absolutely no difference whether or not they are depleted. If depletion does matter--as they assure us it does--then clearly the trust funds matter; that is, they do, indeed, contain bonds of value. Although the conventional wisdom is that Social Security functions in a pay-as-you-go manner, that is not entirely correct. It was largely true at one time, but the Reagan administration supported a change to a partially pre-funded plan implemented in the 1983 amendments.

In 1982, a looming cash-flow problem developed. Its magnitude was exaggerated, but certainly it was real. To correct this, the 1983 amendments incorporated the recommendations of a bi-partisan commission that President Reagan appointed. The commission included prominent senators from each party, including Robert Dole, Republican, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat. Its director was future Fed chairman Alan Greenspan.

The Greenspan Commission made a number of recommendations, including accelerating the implementation of tax increases already scheduled, and the like. (There are no more scheduled tax increases.) Congress added two years to the age for full retirement, thus reducing benefits accordingly. (Each beneficiary, that is, will receive benefits for two fewer years than would have been the case without the change.) For those born in 1960 or later, that age became 67, rather than 65. The full retirement age begins creeping up in small increments beginning with those born in 1938.

It is important to note that the 1983 amendments caused a generation of workers to be taxed more than was necessary to pay current benefits. The purpose was to accumulate huge trust funds to pre-fund the benefits that would be required to cover the retirements of the baby boomers. Thus, the 1983 amendments created a partially pre-funded system. This replaced the previous pay-as-you-go arrangement that required periodic adjustments of taxes and benefits to keep the trust funds at appropriate levels; levels that had been relatively small.

IV

How Secure is Social Security's Funding?

From a strictly economic point of view, there is no need for trust funds. The programs could be strictly pay-as-you-go, with the current generation paying for its dependents. The trust funds do, though, have a political purpose. As FDR recognized, they establish a claim on the Treasury, and they serve to reassure the public. Ironically, Social Security's opponents have used unfavorable projections to turn the funds themselves into cause for concern, rather than a symbol of stability. They argue that because of projected insufficiency of the trust funds decades in the future, it is urgent to take radical action now. (That action ranges from benefit reductions to elimination of the system, that is, privatization.) It is important to note, however, that the entire overhaul of the system resulting in the 1983 amendments took only a matter of months. It did not require action decades in advance of a perceived problem, nor did it require radical restructuring of Social Security's principles of social insurance.

The major cause for concern regarding Social Security is that the public, and for that matter policy makers also, have been told that the trust funds at some date will be inadequate to pay Social Security's benefits. Such assumptions have resulted from reports by the Social Security Trustees. Two of the six trustees are public members; the remaining four are administration figures: the commissioner of social security, plus three cabinet secretaries from the Departments of Labor, the Treasury, and Health and Human Services. The law requires the trustees to issue annual reports, and to project the status of the trust funds over thirty-year and seventy-five-year periods. It is a mistake to consider the Trustees to be non-partisan or disinterested observers, independent of administration policy. As for their reports, the Social Security Administration's chief actuary must certify them as incorporating sound actuarial practice. This in no way, though, guarantees that the Trustees will be evenhanded in selecting from an enormous variety of acceptable alternatives to arrive at their conclusions. To say this is merely to state the facts, not to draw conclusions about the quality of the Trustees' performance.

Economist and Social Security scholar Arthur Benavie put it well. Without questioning "the skills or the integrity of the trustees," it should be recognized that "a projection like this is an educated guess, which could be miles off the mark and often is. It's based on a battery of assumptions, each of which is also an educated guess, about future births, deaths, interest rates, wage rates, productivity, immigration, and health care costs."/6/ In every report, the trustees warn that long-term projections cannot be reliable, and should be taken with caution. One struggles in vain, however, to find any caution in politicians' and journalists' public warnings of impending trust-fund exhaustion.

The public reads that the trustees report for 2007 has projected that the funds will be depleted in 2041, and that continuing income will be sufficient then to pay roughly only three-quarters of the benefits projected. Even if this were to be the case, that level of benefits is projected to be higher than the benefits currently being paid. But is this really what the report says?

Rarely, if ever, does the public hear that the reports include three projections. The only one publicized is the "intermediate projection," the trustees' "alternative II." This is the one that the trustees believe to present the most likely scenario; but nowhere do they say definitively that 2041 will be the "doomsday year," or in fact that the funds will definitely be depleted someday. The "low-cost projection," their "alternative I," projects a continuing surplus indefinitely, and for years the alternative I projections have been much closer to actual economic conditions than have the intermediate projections. The alternative III, or high-cost, projection is so pessimistic that no one takes it seriously.

The consulting actuary, David Langer, has studied the projections closely, and has demonstrated that for years, the trustees' reports have been far too pessimistic in their intermediate projections than conditions have warranted. He compared the projections for given years with what the actual trust fund assets turned out to be. The intermediate projections for 2002 in the reports from 1992 to 1996 turned out to be too pessimistic by 20%; for the reports from 1997 to 2001, they were 3% too pessimistic; for the overall reports from 1992-2001, the underestimation of assets averaged 11%. The low cost, or alternative I projections for each of these periods were accurate. Langer "concluded that, since the low cost basis was on target, it should replace intermediate cost, which has served as the official standard for thinking about and developing Social Security legislation. Further, intermediate cost should be renamed high cost and a new low cost should be developed."/7/

The trustees have chosen intermediate assumptions that guarantee pessimistic projections. For instance, in arriving at their intermediate projections in the 2003 report, they assumed that the annual increase in the GDP for the 75-year period from 2003-2078 would average only 2%. This, despite the average growth rate since 1930 of 3.3%, and 3% in the decade prior to 2004. Langer pointed out that the 2003 report's alternative I, or low-cost, projection assumed a future growth rate of 2.6% (still lower than past performance), and he calculated that such a rate would result in a surplus at the end of the 75-year period of at more than a trillion dollars (a figure that the trustees did not include in their report)./8/

Projections, especially over the long term, are extremely sensitive to small variations in assumptions. In the 1983 report, the trustees projected that the trust funds would maintain a small balance indefinitely. Yet shortly thereafter, they began to project a deficit. Where did the surplus go? The more pessimistic projections resulted not from deteriorating conditions, but rather from the trustees' decision to use different assumptions. Almost no one, though, thinks to look behind the intermediate projections to determine why it is that the surplus suddenly became a deficit.

There are several points that one should bear in mind. First, the low cost, or alternative I, projections still call for balance in the trust funds indefinitely. Second, no such projection can be assumed accurate over a long period, but the alternative I projections thus far have consistently been closer to actual developments than the alternative II, intermediate, projections. Third, even the pessimistic intermediate projection has never called for trust fund exhaustion sooner than thirty-two years in the future. Fourth, any deficit that did appear to be developing could be remedied relatively quickly, as it was in a period of a few months when a bi-partisan commission developed the foundation for the 1983 amendments. Fifth, if anyone still believes that 2041 is a precise date for trust fund exhaustion, consider that over a decade the intermediate projection's exhaustion date has varied by twelve years, from 2029 in 1997 until 2041 today. Obviously, those dates cannot all be correct, yet journalists and policymakers have accepted each of the variations, year by year, without question. If the date is accurate, it will--by definition--remain the same. If economic conditions change and thus cause the date to change, then the projection was inaccurate in not having foreseen the economic changes. If the projection varies and economic conditions have not changed, then certainly something else is wrong. The bottom line is that, as Arthur Benavie put it, the projected dates are educated guesses--let us say that at best they are educated guesses. Do keep in mind that there is at least a possibility that political considerations may affect the calculations. In no case are the projections sufficiently sound to serve as the basis for wrenching revisions--benefit cuts, privatization, or anything similar--for a program that is so important to millions of people.

What are the possible political considerations that might affect the Trustees' reports? The Trustees select from a wide range of actuarial calculations to arrive at their projections. Thus it would be simple for them to slant their choices to make their projections regarding Social Security's future either reassuring or alarming. Conspiracy theorists sometimes conclude that the Trustees, being predominantly members of the administration, do just that: they deliberately design their projections to fit the Bush administration's position that Social Security is "unsustainable." Such a conclusion is overly cynical, and probably unfair. In any case, it falls apart upon analysis.

Clinton's Trustees produced similar, overly pessimistic, projections and these of course had absolutely nothing to do with pleasing George Bush. Certainly there were conservatives serving under Clinton, but the more likely explanation of the pessimism of the advisory boards serving under each of the last three presidents is that their members simply have exercised the caution that one might expect from successful figures in business. In other words, the members likely have tended to assume that it is better to err on the side of caution.

Nevertheless, one might reasonably conclude that the Trustees, especially from a highly ideological administration such as that of the second Bush, might quite honestly be more impressed with projections that fit their ideological presuppositions than with those that do not. Therefore, "political considerations" could certainly enter into the picture, even when there is no conscious attempt to alter the projections either way, as political appointees select those options that seem to them to be most sound. This would be the case, of course, regardless of the political persuasion involved.

In addition to those already described, there is yet another factor that should serve to settle fears for Social Security. The important factor is not the number of aged as opposed to others. Rather, it is the dependency ratio; that is, the percentage of the population in the work force compared to those who are dependent those who cannot work because they are disabled, too old, or too young. Currently, the work force includes about 46% of the population. In 2030, when the baby boomers will be in retirement, that figure will drop to around 44%. In 1965, though, only 37% of the population was in the workforce, and there was no difficulty maintaining Social Security. The reason why an aging population will not result in a dramatic shrinking of the workforce is because women have moved into employment in great numbers. Remember that nearly one-third of Social Security's benefit checks go to those younger than retirement age. Their relative numbers will shrink as the population ages.

Thus, there is little ground for serious concern regarding the future of Social Security. The question is one of political will, not of economics. There should be no doubt that an economy such as that of the United States will be able to continue to support Social Security, or even an expanded system of social insurance.

Privatization certainly is not an answer even for those who continue to have doubts about Social Security's financing. First, a privatized scheme would introduce risk into the system. That risk would all fall on the individual worker, rather than be spread among the whole population. Some would do well, while others would fall short. Second, many things would be lost. There would no longer be coverage for disability, for survivors, or for spouses. There would no longer be guaranteed protections against inflation. The income-transfer features would be lost, and the poor and middle class would suffer accordingly.

Experience in other countries bears this out. Although the Cato Institute and other privatization advocates long pointed to the systems in Great Britain and Chile as unqualified successes, reality intruded into their glowing descriptions. Britain was their first disappointment. The partially privatized system that the Thatcher government instituted turned out to be a failure. The Wall Street Journal summed it up in the headline of a front-page article on 10 August 1998, "Social Security Switch in U.K. Is Disastrous," and the Journal asked whether Britain's experience should be "a caution to the U.S.?" Huge numbers of pensioners were left with far smaller amounts than they had been led to believe would be the case, and the government had to step in with an $18 billion bailout. Interestingly, those who had touted the British system did not stop their campaign for privatization. They merely ceased to refer to the U.K.

The Chilean experience is similar. The military dictatorship of General Pinochet had imposed a privatized system on Chile's population. Cato hired José Piñera, one of the architects of the Chilean system, as a speaker. "Every worker a capitalist," was his enthusiastic phrase in tribute to the Pinochet system as he spoke for years around the United States. Cato's spokesmen ignored the troubling aspects of Chile's system--including its astronomical administrative costs which contrasted with Social Security's unparalleled efficiency. Chile's retirees, though, were under no illusion. Their retirement checks were far smaller than they would have been under the public system.

A telling fact is that the one most privileged group under Pinochet, the army, wisely stayed out of his privatized system. The army's personnel retained their public pensions. A soldier's retirement therefore now is many times that of a civilian worker's. President Bush had called Chile's system "a great example," and said the U.S. could "take some lessons from Chile." Nevertheless, the Pinochet system's performance has been so bad that Chile recently announced that it was shifting back in the direction of a public system./9/

V

Social Security is a tried and true system, popular, successful, and highly efficient. It would be foolish to revise it radically based upon tenuous long-term projections that some critics charge have been influenced by political ideology. The principle of a private system is that "you're on your own, and if things don't work out well, then tough!" One may genuinely prefer a completely private system and accept its risk and variable results, but this is a value judgment, an ideological position, not one dictated by economic principles.

Finally, since Bush's privatization proposals aroused great public opposition, and his party lost control of Congress, might it be alarmist to be concerned about Social Security? Is it not true that the opponents have been beaten?

My answer is that opposition assuredly will continue. Bush himself has asserted that he will maintain his efforts. Given the decline in his standing that is unlikely to amount to anything, but there is no doubt that opposition to Social Security remains strong and well-financed. The danger is less from a clumsy Bush strike at the program--such as when his "60 cities in 60 days" tour brought increasing rejection of his proposals with each city he visited--than from the widespread public misunderstanding that the opponents have succeeded in creating.

So long as there is fear that Social Security is unstable, so long as even many of its supporters continue to believe that some sort of "reform" is necessary to "save" it, and so long as mainstream journalists continue to foster that idea there is danger. There remains the possibility that a misguided and misrepresented "reform" could gain acceptance. The resulting revisions would have the potential to damage the social insurance severely, and even ultimately to eliminate the most popular and successful program in American history.

The United States once had a completely private system of retirement, and lacked the protections that we now take for granted from social insurance. That system proved to be inadequate. That is why we now have Social Security.


Notes

  1. See Thomas Hungerford, et al., "Trends in the Economic Status of the Elderly," Social Security Bulletin 64.3 (Jan. 2003): 4, Chart 1; available at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v64n3/v64n3p12.html, retrieved 21 May 2007.[Back]
  2. See Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Putting the Social Security Debate in Context, "By the Numbers" (chart). Available at http://www.cbpp.org/pubs/socsec.htm; retrieved 21 May 2007.[Back]
  3. See Max J. Skidmore, Social Security and its Enemies (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999); for a more recent analysis, see Michael Hiltzik, The Plot Against Social Security (New York: Harper Collins, 2005).[Back]
  4. See Marilyn Moon, "Are Social Security Benefits Too High or Too Low?" in Social Security in the 21st Century, eds. Eric Kingson and James Schulz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 65, Table 4.1; for difficulties in measuring replacement rates, see Eugene Steuerle, Christopher Spiro, & Adam Carasso, "Measuring Replacement Rates at Retirement," Urban institute #24 in Series "Straight Talk on Social Security and Retirement Policy," May 30, 2000. Available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=309531; retrieved 14 May 2007.[Back]
  5. Arloc Sherman, "Social Security Lifts 1 Million Children Above the Poverty Line," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (2 May 2005). Available at http://www.cbpp.org/5-2-05socsec.htm; retrieved on 21 May 2007.[Back]
  6. Arthur Benavie, Social Security Under the Gun (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 7.[Back]
  7. David Langer, "Scrapping Social Security's Intermediate Cost Assumptions" (Letter to the Editor), Society of Actuaries 59 (August 2005): 34-35 (in Pension Section News); quotation on p. 34. Available at http://www.soa.org/library/newsletters/the-pension-forum/2005/august/psn0508.pdf.[Back]
  8. Langer, "Memorandum to Officials of the American Academy of Actuaries and the Society of Actuaries," 16 June 2004. This and Langer's other papers are available at his website http://www.davidlanger.com.[Back]
  9. See Larry Rohter, "Chile Proposes to Reform Pension System: Partial Retreat from Privatization Would Increase Benefits," The New York Times, 26 December 2006, A16.[Back]

[The Montana Professor 18.1, Fall 2007 <http://mtprof.msun.edu>]


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